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THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE-MORE
THAN A PROPERTY RIGHT, A PRIVACY RIGHT
Jace C. Gatewood*
More than two hundred years ago, William Blackstone defined the right
of property as "that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right
of any other individual in the universe." This concept, commonly referred to
as the Right to Exclude, has been arguably one of the most significant and
essential elements in defining our understanding of what constitutes property
in the United States. Since Blackstone's description of property in the mid-
eighteenth century, the right to exclude others has emerged as the single most
important factor in determining the existence of private property. Histori-
cally, the right to exclude concerns the relationship between people with re-
spect to things, "such that the so-called owner can exclude others from
certain activities or permit others to engage in those activities and in either
case secure assistance of the law in carrying out this decision." But, from a
present-day perspective, the right to exclude is so muchi more than a property
right that defines the existence of private property and the relationships be-
tween owners and things. It is a right that has evolved beyond the legal con-
structs of traditional property law to also encompass legal entitlements and
benefits possessed by one person over another irrespective of the legal rela-
tionship between such person and the thing in which the right is claimed.
This Article explores the evolution of the right to exclude beyond being an
essential and fundamental property right associated primarily with interests
in "things" (i.e., in rein conception of property rights) to also being the socie-
tal compass that helps form reasonable expectations of privacy that guide us
in our dealings and relationships with one another (i.e., in personamn concep-
tion of property rights). This Article also addresses how this new under-
standing of the right to exclude may be used to resolve expanding privacy
concerns, particularly in the wake of advanced surveillance technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
More than two hundred years ago, William Blackstone' defined the
right of property as "that sole and despotic dominion, which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion
* Jace C. Gatewood (Georgetown University, A.B., 1983: Georgetown University Law Center,
J.D., 1990), Associate Professor of Law at Atlanta's John Marshall Law School. I would like to give
special thanks to my research assistant Ms. Kandice Allen, whose thorough research and tireless
dedication were invaluable.
1. William Blackstone was a professor of English law. His Commentaries on the Laws of En-
gland (1765-69) were popular in both England and the United States. JESSE DTKEMINIER ET AL.,
PROPERTY 24 (7th ed. 2010).
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of the right of any other individual in the universe."' This concept, com-
monly referred to as the Right to Exclude,3 has been arguably one of the
most significant and essential elements in defining our understanding of
what constitutes property in the United States.4 Historically, our legal un-
derstanding of property ownership has generally been expressed metaphor-
ically as a "bundle of sticks" or a "bundle of rights" that define our rights
vis-5-vis each other with respect to "things" in which we claim an owner-
ship interest.6 This bundle of rights, as expressed by one set of commenta-
tors, "h[as] always been fundamental to and part of the preservation of
liberty and personal freedom in the United States."7 While it is not clear
from where the metaphor "bundle of rights" stems,8 it is clear that there
are a number of identifiable rights that commonly make up this "bundle,"'
principal among them is the right to exclude others.o Since Blackstone's
description of property in the mid-eighteenth century, the right to exclude
has emerged as the single most important factor in determining the exis-
tence of private property." This proposition is supported by many legal
scholars and jurists.1 2 In 1918, Justice Brandeis noted that "[a]n essential
2. WILLIAi BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (photo. reprint, Univ.
of Chi. Press 1979) (1766) (emphasis added).
3. The right to exclude, simply defined, is the right of a person to exclude others from the use or
occupancy of a particular thing. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAw, § 103, at
5 (2d ed. 2007).
4. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730, 745 (1998)
(noting that 6[t]here is strong evidence that, with respect to interests in land, the right to exclude is the
first right to emerge in primitive property rights systems . . . [and that] [t]he fact that the right to
exclude can be found in even the most primitive land-rights systems provides further support for the
conclusion that the [right to exclude] provides the key to understanding the nature of property."). See
also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1835, 1836 (2006) (6American courts and commentators have deemed the 'right to exclude' foremost
among the property rights, with the Supreme Court characterizing it as the 'hallmark of a protected
property interest' and leading property scholars describing the right as the core, or the essential ele-
ment, of ownership.") (footnotes omitted).
5. See Strahilevitz, supra note 4, at 1836 (<The American law generally regards the 'bundle of
rights' as property's dominant metaphor.").
6. See Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L. REv. 247, 247 (2007)
(<The modern legal understanding of property ownership in the United States is expressed through a
metaphor as a 'bundle of rights' or 'bundle of sticks."').
7. David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others From Private Property. A
Fundamental Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 39, 39 (2000).
8. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 252-53 (<No one is quite sure where the term 'bundle of sticks'
and 'bundle of rights' came from, but we can identify the sticks or rights that make up the bundle.").
9. Id. at 253 (Author discusses essay written in the early 1960s by Anthony M. Honore, an
Oxford legal scholar, who sought to identify a list of rights or incidents of full ownership which he
claimed was 1common to all 'mature' legal systems."). See also Merrill, supra note 4, at 736 (6[T]he
essence of property lies not just in the right to exclude others, but in a larger set of attributes or inci-
dents, of which the right to exclude is just one.").
10. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 730 (arguing that the right to exclude others is more than just
'one of the most essential' constituents of property-it is the sine qua non.").
11. Id. at 731 (asserting that the 1right to exclude others is a necessary and sufficient condition of
identifying the existence of property.").
12. See e.g., Merrill, supra note 4: Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RTTGERS L.
REv. 357 (1954); Callies & Breemer, supra note 7. See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
176 (1979); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
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element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from en-
joying it."" Since that time, the Supreme Court has often described the
right to exclude as "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property."1 4 These often quoted words
have appeared in numerous Supreme Court decisions where private prop-
erty owners sought just compensation for the government's interference
with the right to exclude under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment." In this sense, the right to exclude is as historically fundamental to
the concept of private property as private property is to the concept of
ownership. 6 From a historical perspective, the right to exclude not only
concerns the relationship between people with respect to things, "such that
the so-called owner can exclude others from certain activities or permit
others to engage in those activities and in either case secure assistance of
the law in carrying out this decision,"" but the right to exclude also con-
cerns the nature of the property owned." Yet, from a present-day perspec-
tive, the right to exclude is so much more than a property right that defines
the existence of private property' 9 and the relationships between owners
and things. It is a right that has evolved beyond the legal constructs of
traditional property law20 to also encompass legal entitlements and benefits
possessed by one person over another irrespective of the legal relationship
between such person and the thing in which the right is claimed. In other
words, the right to exclude has evolved beyond the in rem1 conception of
1003, 1044 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (each quoting Kaiser Aetna,
444 U.S. at 176).
13. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
14. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."); see Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1044; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 (each
quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176).
16. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 250 (In describing the concept of ownership in the early days of
the history of the United States, the Honorable Judge Denise R. Johnson writes, "Ownership provided
a circular justification for property rights that were themselves seen to naturally flow from
ownership.").
17. Cohen, supra note 12, at 373.
18. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. The right to exclude traditionally has been in-
voked where the government attempted to secure access to or otherwise interfere with an individual's
private property. See text accompanying notes 14 and 15. See also Callies & Breemer, supra note 7, at
41 ("Federal Courts have clearly recognized the fundamental nature of the right to exclude in cases
where the government attempts to secure access to private property.").
19. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 731 (stating that "the right to exclude others is a necessary and
sufficient condition of identifying the existence of property.").
20. Up until the late nineteenth century, interests in land were the principal objects described in
property law. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 250 ("By the end of the nineteenth century, Blackstone's
conception of property had become outdated. Interests in land were no longer the principal objects
described by the law of property."). Beginning in the early twentieth century, Professor Wesley
Hohfeld, in his article, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale
L.J. 16 (1913), began to develop a new understanding of property as relationships among people as
opposed to rights in a thing.
21. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Econonm-
ics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357, 360 (2001) (arguing that "Property rights historically have been regarded as in
rem. In other words, property rights attach to persons insofar as they have a particular relationship to
something and confer on those persons the right to exclude a large and indefinite class of other persons
("the world") from the thing.").
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property first articulated by Blackstone, to also include an in personam"
conception of property that attaches to people as people and reflects socie-
tal notions of reasonable expectations of privacy regarding our interactions
with each other. It is this evolution of the right to exclude that is the scope
of this Article.
This Article will explore such evolution of right to exclude beyond be-
ing an essential and fundamental property right associated primarily with
interests in "things" (i.e., in rem conception of property rights) to also be-
ing the societal compass that helps form reasonable expectations of privacy
that guide us in our dealings and relationships with one another (i.e., in
personain conception of property rights).
This Article makes the case that the right to exclude is an expanded
legal concept that derives its significance not merely from traditional prop-
erty law concepts but also from social norms and societal expectations that
find expression in the laws, customs, and mores of society. As such, the
right to exclude does not merely refer to a statement of fact regarding own-
ership of property but also refers to societal understandings regarding ex-
pectations of privacy that promote and secure the right of an individual to
act in particular ways vis-A-vis others and prevent others from interfering
with his or her actions or invading his or her privacy, provided that such
actions are not prohibited by other social choices and policies society has
decided are more important. In this regard, the concept of the right to
exclude can no longer be limited by the tenements commonly associated
with private property and traditional property law concepts such as owner-
ship and possession. In other words, one cannot fully evaluate the nature
of the right to exclude merely by looking at the legal relationship between
a person and a thing, 4 but rather, one must also delve into societal expec-
tations and social norms concerning one's actions in relation to another's
actions independent of any legal interest in whatever "thing" is owned. In
essence, the nature and existence of right to exclude is not solely depen-
dent on the nature of the "thing" owned or any interest therein, but also on
the choices reflected in social values and reasonable expectations of privacy
that we as a society are willing to enforce in relation to each other.
To provide the full basis for the premise of this Article, this Article is
divided into three parts. Part II will explore the historical significance of
the right to exclude and its role in defining private property and property
rights. Part III will discuss the evolution and expansion of the right to ex-
clude beyond historical notions of private property and traditional property
law concepts to more contemporary understandings of property rights that
22. See id. at 360-61 (associating the in rem conception of property with William Blackstone).
23. See id. at 360 (stating that 6[i]n personam rights attach to persons as persons and obtain
against one or a small number of other identified persons.").
24. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 249 (stating that [t]he bundle of rights metaphor was intended
to signify that property is a set of legal relationships among people and is not merely ownership of
'things' or the relationships between owners and things.").
25. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 733 (stating that 1the rights associated with property require
some institutional structure that stands ready to enforce these rights").
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also encompass reasonable expectations of privacy that secure certain ben-
efits and entitlements of a person enforceable by law independent of tradi-
tional concepts of property law. Finally, Part IV will address how this new
understanding of the right to exclude may be used to resolve expanding
privacy concerns, particularly in the wake of advanced surveillance
technology.
II. THE RIGHT To EXCLUDE-HISTORICALLY IN REM PROPERTY RIGHT
Since the days of William Blackstone,2 the right to exclude has histor-
ically been tied to an interest in property; a right in remn. Professors
Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith make this single point in their es-
say, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?21 In their essay,
while describing the traditional conception of property, Professors Merrill
and Smith note that La] number of historically significant property theo-
rists have recognized the in rein nature of property rights ... ."2 Their
essay discusses in noteworthy fashion the understandings of key eighteenth
century theorists such as Blackstone,o Adam Smith,"1 and Jeremy Ben-
tham, all who espoused to variations of the in rein theory of property
rights-"a distinctive right in a thing good against the world that promotes
security of expectations about the use and enjoyment of particular re-
sources."" This notion that the right to exclude has historically been re-
garded as an in rein property right-a right well entrenched in the
ownership of things-is strongly supported by development of our com-
mon law trespass laws.
At common law, according to Blackstone, trespass, as narrowly de-
fined, "signifie[d] no more than an entry on another man's ground without
a lawful authority, and doing some damage, however inconsiderable, to his
26. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
27. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 360-61 (2001) (associating the in renz conception of
property with William Blackstone).
28. Id. at 360 ("We will not attempt in this Essay to provide anything like a comprehensive
survey of the history of the concept of property. Instead, we stress a single point: Property rights
historically have been regarded as in rem. In other words, property rights attach to persons insofar as
they have a particular relationship to something and confer on those persons the right to exclude a large
and indefinite class of other persons ('the world') from the thing.").
29. Id.
30. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
31. Adam Smith (1723-1790) was a Scottish philosopher and considered to be a pioneer of politi-
cal economics. He is best known for two literary works: The Theory of Moral Sentiments published in
1759, and a five-book series entitled An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
published in 1776. Adam Smith (1723-1790), THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOmucs, http://
www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Smith.html (last visited October 30, 2013).
32. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was a Utilitarian and English philosopher and a notable critic
of William Blackstone. He is best known for his utilitarian work entitled, Introduction to the Principles
of Morals and Legislation, published in 1789. See BLTC Research Jerenmy Bentham (1748-1832), UTIL-
ITARIANISM.ORG, http://utilitarianism.org/bentham.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
33. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 366.
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real property." For Blackstone, no action for trespass could be main-
tained at common law unless there was some ownership or possession of
real property. 5 While there has been some controversy over the origins of
the law of trespass, one theory would regard trespass as having its origin
in the assize of novel disseisin,3 a common law action principally con-
cerned with whether a plaintiff was dispossessed of land.3 In other words,
trespass laws evolved from and were designed to protect the exclusive pos-
session of an owner or occupier of land (i.e., the right to exclude others
from land).39 The Supreme Court's treatment of the right to exclude has
historically bared witness to this notion.
In several Supreme Court decisions involving the government's inva-
sion of the right to exclude under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court has often maintained that the right to exclude is a
universally fundamental property right that cannot be interfered with by
government action.40 For example, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,4 1 the
United States Army Corps of Engineers claimed that when petitioners con-
verted a once private pond into a marina and connected it to the bay, it
created a "navigational servitude" in favor of the Federal Government,
thus requiring the owners of the pond to allow public access. 49  In finding
that the government's actions of attempting to create a public right of ac-
cess was a taking, the Court stated, "we hold that the 'right to exclude,' so
universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls
within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without
bust] compensation."4
Yet another example of the Supreme Court's historical in rem treat-
ment of the right to exclude appears in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
34. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 3, at 209 (photo. re-
print, Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1766). Blackstone also recognized a broader interpretation of trespass
which encompassed not only a trespass to real property, but a trespass to "the law of nature, of society,
or of the country in which we live, whether it relates to a man's person or his property." Id. at 208.
35. See id. at 210 ("One must have property (either absolute or temporary) in the soil, and actual
possession by entry, to be able to maintain an action of trespass: or at least, it is requisite that the party
have a lease and possession of the vesture and herbage of the land.") (footnote omitted).
36. See George E. Woodbine, Origins of the Action of Trespass, 33 Yale L. J. 799, 799 (1924)
("Much has been written on the early history of trespass, but the actual origins of the action in its
different forms have received such scant attention from the writers, that what they have said relative
thereto can be regarded as hardly more than suggestions of possibilities and probabilities.").
37. See Id. at 806-08.
38. Id. at 807. See also THEODORE F. T. PLTCKNEr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF COMMON LAW 369
(5th ed. 1956).
39. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 77 (5th
ed. 1984).
40. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 419 (1982); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831
(1987); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1044 (1992); and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 384 (1994).
41. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 164.
42. Id. at 170.
43. Id. at 179-80 (footnote omitted).
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CA TV Corp."4 The Supreme Court in Loretto found that a New York stat-
ute that authorized a cable television (CATV) company to install its CATV
facilities on the roofs of apartment buildings constituted a physical taking
under the Fifth Amendment even though the equipment only occupied a
small amount of space.15 In defining the scope of taking by the govern-
ment, the Court stated that "[s]uch an appropriation is perhaps the most
serious form of invasion of an owner's property interests."46 The Court
continued by embellishing on an often-quoted metaphor: "the government
does not simply take a single 'strand' from the 'bundle' of property rights:
it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand.""7
Providing yet more support for the notion that the right to exclude was
firmly engrained in the in rem conception of property is the Supreme
Court's decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council." Lucas in-
volved a regulation that prohibited the owner of two beachfront lots from
building on them."9 Although there was no physical taking of property as
in Loretto, the Court found that "where [a] regulation denies all economi-
cally beneficial or productive use of land"50 that is the equivalent of a phys-
ical appropriation .5  Lucas expanded the nature of "takings" to included
non-physical invasions of real property where there is a substantial inter-
ference with a person's right to exclude others from the appropriation of
his property.52 This idea that a non-physical invasion of property rights
could constitute a taking where the right to exclude others has been in-
vaded by the government can also been found in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission.5 3
In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission conditioned the issu-
ance of a building permit to replace a small bungalow on petitioners'
beachfront property with a larger home on the granting by petitioners of an
access easement allowing the public to cross petitioners' property to access
public beaches.54 The Court found that requiring the petitioners to grant a
public access easement interfered with the petitioners' right to exclude, and
thus constituted a taking.5 The Court stated, "[w]e have repeatedly held
that, as to property reserved by its owner for private use, the right to ex-
clude [others is] one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
44. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419.
45. Id. at 441.
46. Id. at 435.
47. Id.
48. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1003 (1992).
49. Id. at 1007-09.
50. Id. at 1015.
51. Id. at 1017 (In the view of the Court, "total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the land-
owner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation.").
52. The Lucas Court adopted a "categorical" takings rule: a taking will always be found if regula-
tion eliminates "all economically beneficial or productive use of land," unless the regulation is justified
under background principles of property or nuisance law. Id. at 1029-31.
53. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 825 (1987).
54. Id. at 828.
55. Id. at 831-42.
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are commonly characterized as property. . . . We think a permanent physi-
cal occupation has occurred, for purposes of that rule .... "
As the above cases illustrate, Supreme Court jurisprudence has not
only firmly established the right to exclude as an essential element of real
property rights, but Supreme Court jurisprudence has firmly fixed the right
to exclude as an in rein property right, tied to one's ownership interest in
private property.
Still further support, and perhaps stronger support, for the concept
that property rights were historically in rein in nature is the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment.5 ' The Fourth Amendment provides strong historical
support that the right to exclude was historically an in rein property right
designed to protect rights not only in property, but also in privacy.
When the Fourth Amendment was adopted in the latter part of the
eighteenth century, the primary focal point of concern was the home. 9
According to researchers, "[s]earches [under the Fourth Amendment] re-
ferred to the forcing open of persons' houses and the breaking open of
their desks and cabinets in an effort to find evidence inside."o6 Thus, his-
torically, in order to violate the Fourth Amendment there needed to be
some sort of physical intrusion or trespass by the government on property
belonging to another.6 ' Thus, as borne by history, trespass (which is predi-
cated on the notion of the right to exclude)6 2 became the predominate the-
ory used by the Supreme Court to determine whether a search had
occurred under Fourth Amendment. The use of trespass as the driving
force behind Fourth Amendment protections is clearly evident throughout
the Fourth Amendment's doctrinal history.
56. Id. at 831-32 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. See Merrel & Smith, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
58. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
59. See Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 St P. CT. REV.
67, 72 (2012) ("Famous search and seizure cases leading up to the Fourth Amendment involved physical
entries into homes, violent rummaging for incriminating items once inside, and then arrests and the
taking away of evidence found. These examples, and some contemporaneous statements during the
ratification debates, suggest that home entries and rummaging around inside were understood as the
paradigmatic examples of 'searches."'), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154611.
60. Id. at 73.
61. See Kerr, supra note 59, at 92. See also Jace C. Gatewood, Warrantless GPS Surveillance.
Search and Seizure-Using the Right to Exclude to Address the Constitutionality of GPS Tracking Sys-
tems Under the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. MENI. L. REv. 303, 333 (2011) ("[T]he Supreme Court recog-
nized trespass as the driving force for Fourth Amendment protection.").
62. See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14
J. LEGAL STLTD. 13, 13 (1985) ('With respect to property in land ... the right to exclude depends to a
large extent on whether the intrusion in question is subject to common law trespass or of nuisance.").
63. See Gatewood, supra note 61, at 333-342 (discussing the use by the Supreme Court of the
trespass doctrine" from Olmstead to Katz and how, even after Katz, physical intrusion into a constitu-
tionally protected area was still the barometer in determining Fourth Amendment violations).
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The first articulation of the Supreme Court's recognition of trespass as
the impetus behind Fourth Amendment protection was in Olnstead v.
United States.64 In Olrnstead, the Court set forth what became known as
the "trespass doctrine,"65 which was based on the notion that "the Fourth
Amendment protected 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' when these
entities were located in a 'constitutionally protected area.' "66 In Olrnstead,
federal agents installed wire taps in the streets outside the defendant's
home.6 ' The Olrnstead court found that since there was no trespassing into
the home or curtilage of the defendant there was no violation of the defen-
dant's Fourth Amendment rights.68  The Olrnstead opinion set the course
for all later Supreme Court decisions regarding Fourth Amendment viola-
tions where there was a physical trespass up until the early 1960s 69 when
the Court slowly began to shift its focus to privacy rather than focus on
whether or not there had been a physical trespass.o The formal shift from
the trespass doctrine to a privacy-based doctrine came with the Supreme
Court's decision in Katz v. United States," where the Supreme Court fash-
ioned a new test to determine Fourth Amendment violations-the reasona-
ble expectation of privacy test.
Beginning with the Katz decision in 1967 through 2011, the Katz rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test was the primary test for determining
when a search had occurred under the Fourth Amendment. However, in
January 2012, the Supreme Court, in an unparalleled opinion, returned to
64. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
65. See David P. Miraldi, Comment, The Relationship Between Trespass and Fourth Amendment
Protection After Katz v. United States, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 709, 710-11 (detailing the Supreme Court's use
of the "trespass doctrine" as a trigger for Fourth Amendment protection).
66. See id. at 710.
67. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456-57
68. Id. at 466.
69. See Gatewood, supra note 61, at 334 n. 178 ("The subtle break from the "trespass doctrine"
began with Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S.
83 (1980). Here, police officers arrested the defendant for possession of drugs while he was a guest in a
friend's home. Id. at 258-59. The Court held that, despite being a guest in a friend's home, since the
defendant was legitimately on the property, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy protected under
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 261-62.").
70. But see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). In Jones, in holding the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the government used a GPS tracking device to track the
suspect's movements for 4 weeks, the five-Justice majority returned to the trespass doctrine first articu-
lated in Olmstead. The majority reasoned that applying common-law trespass principles best preserved
the degree of privacy against intrusions by the government that existed when the Fourth Amendment
was adopted, stating that "We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered
a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted." Id. at 949.
71. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (the Court concluded that "the underpinnings of Olm-
stead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there
enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling." Id. at 353. But the Court also stated that the
Fourth Amendment protects individual privacy, "but its protections go further, and often have nothing
to do with privacy at all," id. at 350, suggesting that property rights are not the only measure of Fourth
Amendment violations. Id. at 350).
72. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (The Court adopted a two-pronged test for determining
when a "search" had occurred. The first prong considers whether the defendant has a subjective expec-
tation of privacy that was violated, and the second prong considers whether the defendant's subjective
expectation of privacy is one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.).
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the trespass doctrine in United States v. Jones73 to decide the issue of
whether the use and installation of GPS tracking device to track the move-
ments of a suspect on public streets constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment. 4 Justice Scalia writing for the majority wrote:
It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case:
The Government physically occupied private property for
the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt
that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when it was adopted.
Citing Entick v. Carrington, Justice Scalia quotes the following passage
in support of his view:
[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no
man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without his
leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no dam-
age at all; if he will tread upon his neighbour's ground, he
must justify it by law. 6
What the above illustrates is that throughout our history the law of
trespass has played and continues to play a critical role in protecting one's
right to exclude. It is equally clear from the above that the right to exclude
has been well grounded in the in rein nature of property rights; a right
primarily attaching to "persons insofar as they have a particular relation-
ship to some thing and confer on those persons the right to exclude a large
and indefinite class of other persons ('the world') from the thing."
If, yet further support is needed that the right to exclude has been
firmly connected with the in rein nature of property rights, several legal
writers may provide such support. For instance, Professor Thomas W.
Merrill contends in his Article, Property and the Right to Exclude, that
without the right to exclude one has no property.78 He expounds by saying,
"[g]ive someone the right to exclude others from a valued resource, i.e., a
resource that is scarce relative to the human demand for it, and you give
them property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have
property."79  In their Article, The Right to Exclude Others from Private
73. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945; See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
74. In Jones, the government used a GPS tracking device attached to a vehicle driven by the
defendant to track the defendant over a 28-day period. Based in part on the information gathered from
the use of the GPS tracking device, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute, and posses-
sion with intent to distribute, cocaine and cocaine base. The conviction was reversed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and affirmed by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
75. Id. at 949 (citing Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)).
76. Id. (citation omitted).
77. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 360.
78. Merrill, supra note 4, at 730.
79. Id. at 730.
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Property: A Fundamental Constitutional Right, Professor David L. Callies
and co-author J. David Breemer, conclude that, "[t]he right of a landowner
to exclude others is a fundamental part of the equally fundamental Consti-
tutional Right to the enjoyment of private property."8 0 Yet another author
makes the point that, "[t]he idea of exclusion, in one form or the other,
tends to inform almost any understanding of property - be it private, public
or community."8 1
The in rein view of the right to exclude on an historical basis can be
firmly and clearly established. However, because the right to exclude is so
closely linked to the right of privacy as established by Fourth Amendment
doctrinal history and the use of trespass to protect one's right to exclude
and one's right of privacy, the right to exclude cannot be limited by its
historical in rein context. To be clear, as the Fourth Amendment has ex-
panded privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment beyond the con-
straints of the home and personal effects, the right to exclude has expanded
beyond the purely historical in rein nature of property (i.e., merely attach-
ing to "persons insofar as they have a particular relationship to some-
thing")83 to encompass an in personain view of property that attaches to
persons based upon one's reasonable expectations irrespective of a particu-
lar relationship in some "thing."
III. THE EXPANSION OF THE RIGHT To EXCLUDE-BEYOND
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The evolution and expansion of right to exclude from a purely in rein
property right to an in person am property right can be linked to the evolu-
tion and expansion of privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment. As
explained earlier, the Supreme Court has historically recognized that the
right to exclude is uncontrovertibly linked to the right to privacy, a fact
made clear by the Supreme Court's initial (and continued)84 use of trespass
to resolve Fourth Amendment issues. However, due to advances in tech-
nology and the Supreme Court's concern that an individual's privacy could
be invaded without any physical trespass, the Supreme Court began to
80. Callies & Bremer, supra note 7, at 58.
81. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Denzystifying the Right to Exclude. Of Property, Inviolability, and
Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARv. J.L. & PtB. POL'Y 593, 596 (2008) (footnote omitted).
82. See Gatewood, supra note 61, at 333-42 (discussing the use by the Supreme Court of the
"trespass doctrine" from Olmstead to Katz and how, even after Katz, physical intrusion into a constitu-
tionally protected area was still the barometer in determining Fourth Amendment violations. Author
notes that "notwithstanding the Katz holding and the outright rejection of any "physical intrusion" test
as a means to determine Fourth Amendment violations, the Court has on several occasions relied on
the presence of a physical intrusion into a place or thing to make an assessment in what society deems
as reasonable." Id. at 335.).
83. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 360.
84. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
85. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Brandeis's
dissent advocated that in order to protect citizens from abuses in advances in technology, "every unjus-
tifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.").
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shift its focus from a property-based paradigm to a privacy-based para-
digm." This shift necessarily caused a shift in how property rights, particu-
larly the right to exclude, were evaluated, and it's this shift that has caused
the evolution and expansion of the right to exclude consistent with the
evolution of privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment.
One might think that the logical place to start when assessing the
evolution of the right to exclude beyond a purely property-based (in rein)
analysis to a reasonable expectation of privacy (in personamn) analysis is
Katz. However, the evolution of the right to exclude began several years
before Katz with Jones v. United States.17
In Jones, the petitioner was a guest in an apartment of a friend that
was searched by federal officers pursuant to a search warrant." During the
search, narcotics were found and seized, and the petitioner was arrested for
drug violations." The petitioner moved to suppress the evidence so seized
as an illegal search."o In holding that the petitioner had standing to chal-
lenge the search as illegal," the Court stated that:
it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law sur-
rounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasona-
ble searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and
refined by the common law in evolving the body of private
properly law which, more than almost any other branch of
law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely
historical.1
Thus, instead of linking the defendant's right to exclude an historical in rein
view of property (since defendant maintained no relationship with the
property as he was merely a guest), the Court reasoned the following:
[I]n order to qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure,' one must have been a victim of a search
or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as dis-
tinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the
use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or
seizure directed at someone else. . . . Ordinarily, then, it is
entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the
legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant evi-
dence that he allege, and if the allegation be disputed that
86. See Gatewood, supra note 61, at 363-65 (discussing the Supreme Court's shift from a prop-
erty-based paradigm to a privacy based-paradigm under the Fourth Amendment).
87. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
88. Id. at 259.
89. Id. at 258-259.
90. Id. at 259.
91. The Court found that the petitioner was the "person aggrieved" within the meaning of Rule
41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 260-267. Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure proscribes rules and regulations under which a warrant may be issued. Id.
92. Id. at 266.
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he establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of
privacy.9'
The Court's reasoning signaled the Court's move toward the view that
property rights, principally, the right to exclude, are not purely in rein
rights.
The concept that the right to exclude was moving from a purely in rein
property concept to include an in personain property concept based on
one's expectation of privacy continued with Silverman v. United States.9' In
Silverman, the Court addressed whether a "spike mike" shoved into an ad-
joining wall of a row house where conversations were overheard violated
the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendant. 5 Silverman was a unique
case because it was unclear whether the "spike mike" physically trespassed
onto the defendant's property when it touched the heating duct of the de-
fendant's home. However, the Court refused to limit its inquiry to prop-
erty law concepts stating that "[i]n these circumstances, we need not pause
to consider whether or not there was a technical trespass under the local
property law relating to party walls. Inherent Fourth Amendment rights
are not inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real
property law."9' The Court further explained that "[t]he Fourth Amend-
ment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history. At the
very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."
Silverman illustrates the Court's further willingness to protect a per-
son's right to exclude (the right of a man to retreat into his home and be
free from governmental intrusion)9' irrespective of property law (i.e., in
rein) concepts.
The final push away from a purely in rein property-based Fourth
Amendment analysis to an in personain privacy-based Fourth Amendment
analysis came with Katz.99 Katz marked the first articulation of the Su-
preme Court's outright rejection of property-based analysis, stating that the
Fourth Amendment's reach "cannot turn upon the presence or absence of
a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." 00 In Katz, FBI agents in-
stalled a listening device to the outside of a telephone booth and recorded
the defendant's conversations that were later used to convict the defendant
of wire fraud.o0 The Katz court reasoned that because the defendant was
93. Id. at 261.
94. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
95. Id. at 511-512.
96. Id. at 511(footnote omitted).
97. Id. (citations omitted).
98. Id.
99. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
100. Id. at 353.
101. Id. at 348.
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inside a closed telephone booth he sought to exclude others from his con-
versation by closing the door.10 2 As explained in Justice Harlan's concur-
rence, "'one who occupies [a telephone booth] shuts the door behind him,
pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume'
that his conversation is not being intercepted."' 0 Justice Harlan contin-
ued, "[t]he point is not that the booth is 'accessible to the public' at other
times, but that it is a temporarily private place whose monetary occupants'
expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable."1 04
In other words, while the defendant in Katz did not have any property
interest or other right in the "thing" (i.e., the telephone booth), the Court
recognized the defendant's right to exclude others for the duration of his
telephone call because the defendant had a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy.' The Katz decision provides strong support of the Court's recogni-
tion that an individual's right to exclude cannot be limited to purely in rein
concepts.
Katz marked the beginning of a long line of cases that not only illus-
trate the evolution of privacy rights but also clearly illustrate the evolution
of the right to exclude from an in rein property right, based principally on
one's interest or relationship to a "thing," to an in personain property right,
based principally on one's reasonable expectations of privacy in the
"thing." Several post-Katz examples illustrate this point.
One example is Bond v. United States."o" In Bond, the Court consid-
ered whether the physical manipulation by an officer of the defendant's
carry-on bag while travelling on a bus violated the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights.1 07 While the Court held that a passenger's luggage is
an "effect" protected by the Fourth Amendment,10 the Court based its
decision on whether society was prepared to recognize as reasonable the
defendant's expectation of privacy in his carry-on luggage.' The Court, in
holding that the defendant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his carry-on luggage, noted that while passengers clearly expect that their
bags will be handled, they don't expect that "other passengers or bus em-
ployees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory man-
ner."110 In essence, the Court protected the defendant's right to exclude
others from excessive manipulation of his luggage based, in large part, on
the defendant's expectation of privacy in his luggage-the "thing," not
merely because of the defendant's ownership interest or rights in the
"thing." It is also important to note that in this particular case there was no
physical intrusion into the defendant's luggage, and as such, the Court
102. Id. at 352.
103. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
104. Id. (internal citation omitted).
105. See id. at 352.
106. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
107. Id. at 335.
108. Id. at 336.
109. Id. at 338.
110. Id. at 338-39.
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could not have decided the case on a purely in rein conception of property
since there was no trespass.
Another example is Kyllo v. United States... In Kyllo, the Court held
that the use of a thermal imager that detected heat emanating from the
defendant's home was a search under the Fourth Amendment even though
there was no physical trespass into defendant's home, because the technol-
ogy provided information about the interior of the home not otherwise ob-
tainable without a physical intrusion.1 12 Here again, the Court based its
decision not on traditional in rein property law concepts (i.e., the defen-
dant's ownership interest in his home) since there was no physical trespass,
but rather the Court's decision was based on in personain property law
concepts (i.e., the defendant's expectation of privacy in his home), thus
preserving and protecting the defendant's right to exclude even without a
physical intrusion.
Other examples include Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,"' where
the Court held that the aerial observation and photographing of the outside
of an industrial plant was not a search since there was no physical intrusion;
California v. Ciraolo,"' where the Court held there was no Fourth Amend-
ment violation for the aerial observation of the curtilage of the home of the
defendant because it occurred in a "physically nonintrusive manner;"11
and California v. Greenwood,1 6where the Court addressed the issue of
whether garbage left on the curb outside the curtilage of the defendant's
home is protected by the Fourth Amendment.' In holding that the defen-
dant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash left at the curb, the
Court stated that "Fourth Amendment analysis must turn on such factors
as 'our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupu-
lous protections from government invasion .. . We have already concluded
that society as a whole possesses no such understanding with regard to gar-
bage left for collection at the side of a public street."""
While the Supreme Court in each of the aforementioned cases reached
the conclusion that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, the Court's
decision was based on the fact that the respective defendants had no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the "thing" searched (an in personan
conception of property) and was not based on whether there was physical
trespass or intrusion onto the property of the defendants' (an in rein con-
ception of property)."' In each case, the Court recognized the defendant's
right to exclude based on expectations of privacy but refused to lend
111. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
112. Id. at 40.
113. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237-39 (1986).
114. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
115. Id. at 213.
116. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 42-43 (1988).
117. Id. at 37.
118. Id. at 43-44 (emphasis added).
119. See also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (holding that no Fourth Amendment
search occurred when police used a helicopter to fly above the defendant's home for purpose of aerial
observation as there was no physical intrusion); and Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980)
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credence to the defendants' right to exclude because society was not pre-
pared to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable.
So what does all this mean? What this objectively means is that the
right to exclude has evolved beyond merely representing one's right to ex-
clude others based on one's ownership interest or other right in property,
which is ordinarily protected by common law trespass and other laws pro-
tecting the rights of property owners, to include legitimate expectations of
privacy in places or things for which we may or may not maintain a prop-
erty or other legitimate interest,120 and which ordinarily would not be pro-
tected by common law trespass laws or other laws protecting property
owners.' 1  This expectation affords members of society the absolute right
to exclude others not merely based on traditional property law concepts
(i.e., in rein concepts) but also based upon societal understandings and rea-
sonable expectations of privacy (i.e., in person am concepts).1 22 This expan-
sion of the right to exclude offers new understanding to property rights that
may help resolve issues in the wake of advanced technology, particularly
surveillance technology, that threatens not only property rights but also
privacy rights because such technology is capable of electronically intrud-
ing on one's privacy without physically intruding on one's property and
without violating current Fourth Amendment proscriptions.1 21
IV. THE "NEw" RIGHT To EXCLUDE AND ADVANCED
SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
Under Fourth Amendment proscriptions as currently interpreted:
neither [the tests articulated in] Jones nor the reasonable
expectation of privacy test set forth in Katz provides ade-
quate Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless
(holding that defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy as he did not have the right to exclude
others from accessing a friend's purse).
120. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
121. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476
U.S. 227 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
122. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n. 12 (1978). Justice Rehnquist noted that, "Legitima-
tion of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by
reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and
permitted by society." Id. Justice Rehnquist further noted that:
Expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, of course, need not be based on
a common-law interest in real or personal property, or on the invasion of such an interest ...
But by focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
the Court has not altogether abandoned use of property concepts in determining the presence
or absence of the privacy interests protected by that Amendment. . . . On the other hand, even
a property interest in premises may not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of
privacy with respect to particular items located on the premises or activity conducted thereon.
Id. (citations omitted).
123. See Jace C. Gatewood, Its Raining Katz and Jones. The Implications of United States v.
Jones-A case of Sound and Fury, 33 PACE L. REv. 683 (2013) (making that argument that neither Katz
nor Jones provides adequate protection against warrantless surveillance either because, given today's
technology, "there is no physical trespass involved, because of the nature of the intrusion involved, or
because of the pervasiveness of the technology involved." Id. at 686.
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unwanted electronic intrusions by law enforcement or other
nontrespassory invasions (even though such intrusion may
result in the collection of vast amounts of information about
an individual's daily movements) either because there is no
physical trespass involved, or because of the nature of the
intrusion [is short term] or because the pervasiveness of the
technology involved.'2
Our new understanding of the right to exclude may provide new perspec-
tive to issues involving advanced surveillance technology that current
Fourth Amendment tests lack.1'1
The application of the right to exclude to advanced surveillance tech-
nology would only require that one question be asked and answered:
"Whether the average person would reasonably believe, based on laws,
customs, societal norms, or reasonable expectations, that he or she has a
right to exclude someone from ?" The blank could be fil-
led in with just about anything, such as "tracking his or her every move-
ment via a GPS tracking device" or "recording all of his or her online
purchase" or "tracking his or her cell phone" or "recording and storing his
or her license plate number as he or she traveled up the highway," or even
"recording the phone numbers he or she dialed or text messages he or she
sent." 26 The answer to this question would simply turn on society's rea-
sonable belief that a right to exclude exists based a property interest or
upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. In other words, if one reasona-
bly believes that he or she has a right to exclude others from invading his or
her person, houses, papers or effects, 12 this reasonable expectation should
be protected against Fourth Amendment violations irrespective of whether
the right to exclude arises under principals of property law or understand-
ings recognized by society, or arises as a result of being in a space enclosed
by four walls, in an automobile, or in any other location like a telephone
booth,1 ' and irrespective of whether the invasion of the right to exclude is
for one minute, one hour, one day, or one month if societal norms so
dictate.
Katz provides the strongest support for this proposition. The Katz
court recognized a legitimate expectation of privacy in a closed telephone
booth based on society's expectations that when one enters into a closed
telephone booth, he or she seeks to exclude others, and thus expects his or
124. Id. at 685-86.
125. See Gatewood, supra note 123 and accompanying text.
126. In June 2013, a whistleblower revealed that secret National Security Agency (NSA) programs
are monitoring telephone calls and Internet communications, which include both recording phone num-
bers dialed and text messages sent. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records of millions of
Verizon customers daily, THE GTARDIAN (June, 6 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/
nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order.
127. The Fourth Amendment protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
128. See Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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her conversations will be free from government intrusion. 1' Katz endorses
the proposition that the right to exclude is not merely based on property
rights but legitimate expectations of privacy even in a phone booth.
In addition to Katz, generally accepted societal norms and expecta-
tions in other aspects of our lives lend support to this view. For example,
we as a society espouse to a multiplicity of rights to exclude others, based
strictly upon societal norms and expectations, including the right to exclude
others from entering the same bathroom stall as you (at least while you're
in it); the right to exclude others from sharing your theater seat or taking
your theater seat once you've claimed it (at least for the duration of the
show); the right to exclude others from cutting into waiting lines; the right
to exclude others from entering into one's personal space; and the right to
exclude others from taking items we've laid legitimate claim to even
though we have yet to claim an ownership or other interest in such item,
such as items intending to purchase in a grocery cart. In each of these
instances, society would recognize as reasonable one's right to exclude
others from interfering with this right to exclude, in some cases for the
protection of property, in other cases for the protection of privacy, and, in
yet other cases, just because that's what society has come to expect.
Similarly, with respect to advanced surveillance technology, it would
not be unfathomable that society would recognize as reasonable the right
to exclude others from tracking one's daily movements via a GPS tracking
device, even for a limited period; the right to exclude others from constant
surveillance and monitoring of one's daily activities via enhanced surveil-
lance cameras; the right to exclude others from obtaining from third party
providers personal data such as purchases, numbers dialed, text messages
sent, and other personal information; or the right to exclude others from
amassing a dossier on our public comings and goings, activities and affilia-
tions. Each of these examples would not only presumably violate reasona-
ble expectations of privacy based on acceptable societal understandings
and norms, and thereby violate one's right to exclude, but each of these
examples would fall outside the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment as
currently interpreted.13 0 For these reasons, the use of the expansive right
to exclude would ensure that privacy rights are adequately protected from
advances in technology that would otherwise intrude upon property rights
and privacy rights in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
Once a mere property right, the right to exclude has taken on new
meaning and understanding in the age of expansive privacy concern in the
wake of advanced technology and should take on a more expansive role in
Fourth Amendment privacy issues. The right to exclude, unlike any other
property right, has evolved to encompass societal norms and expectations
129. See id. at 352 (emphasis added).
130. See Gatewood, supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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regarding our dealings and relationships with one another, and provides a
useful benchmark for determining the scope of allowable intrusion into our
daily lives consistent with the laws, customs, and mores of our society.

